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Without a doubt, we are experiencing a difficult moment. These days, our concerns 
seem to orbit in one way or another around the threat of being infected and the 
“costs” derived from regulating it. Although the speed of the “spread” of related 
information gives this phenomenon a contemporary texture (Dawkins’ memetic 
analogy, never again in force), the particular economics of preventing infectious 
contacts is far from being current a concern. Indeed, the presence of parasites and 
the danger of contracting infectious diseases have been a constant threat to the 
survival and reproduction of the species from our ancestral past. As a consequence, 
the need to effectively regulate these threats–often invisible–has “shaped” much 
of our psychology and our social behavior. Given that one of the most powerful 
transmitters of pathogens is ourselves it is relevant to look back at the psychology 
of aversion in the days of COVID-19.
Psychologist Steven Pinker (1997) defines aversion as an “intuitive microbiology”. 
Specifically, it seems that our immune system has a first line of defense that is 
responsible for avoiding the high energy costs (at the metabolic level) that comes 
from fighting infectious agents. This “Behavioral Immune System” (BIS, Schaller and 
Duncan, 2007) would be made up of a series of affective, cognitive and behavioral 
mechanisms, whose common denominator is “hypersensitivity” towards any possible 
indicator of the source of infection. In this way, this system works analogously to 
a smoke detector, prioritizing “false positive” type errors over “false negative” type 
errors. This is due to the “adaptive cost” of each type of error: while the cost of 
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avoiding an ambiguously contagious (but harmless) stimulus is acceptable (“to be 
wrong with the home delivery man”), the cost of approaching a possible entity 
pathogen carrier is much higher (“infection”). Our aversion psychology is first and 
foremost cautious, and social interactions are no exception.
Indeed, the fact that situations of social ambiguity are easily perceived as disturbing 
and dangerous implies a series of consequences for our way of navigating the social 
world. The BIS is an expert in identifying perceptible indicators of disease, but its 
diagnosis is not always correct, far from it. The existence of negative biases towards 
people with facial disfigurement and, in general, towards people with strange and / 
or unattractive faces, could be a side effect of the “hypersensitivity” of this system: 
those deviations from the canons of physical typicality they are implicitly inferred as 
signs of possible disease, and therefore, the conservative BIS diagnosis “suggests” 
establishing social distance. Hence, the psychology of aversion doesn’t think twice 
about quarantining.
In this context, the extension of the psychology of aversion to the moral 
realm cannot be understood without reference to the emotion of disgust. This 
emotional response, originally evolved to avoid the intake of toxic substances (e.g., 
decomposing food) and contact with potential disease-transmitting substances (e.g., 
vomiting, body fluids, blood, excrement, etc.), appears to have been “co -adapted 
“to also avoid interaction with” toxic “people. Thus, in recent decades, various 
studies have documented the existence of a close relationship between disgust 
and moral cognition, a relationship that has not been without controversy given its 
normative implications. One aspect to consider is the associative, uncompromising, 
and irrational nature of this emotional response. Along these lines, the psychologist 
Paul Rozin (2008) observes that, in different cultural systems, disgust obeys two 
“magical” or “ideational” laws: the law of contagion (“once you come in contact, 
you are always in contact) and the law of similarity (“the same thing produces the 
same thing”). The object of disgust therefore has the ability to contaminate anyone 
it touches, and this state of contamination is not easily removable, in the same way 
that a drop of black paint permanently alters the purity of a white paint solution. Like 
all predominantly associative responses, disgust is largely inflexible to reason, and 
the perception of a single action that reveals a person’s “toxicity” may be enough to 
condemn him to moral ostracism. Certainly, various studies have associated disgust 
with signs of bad moral character. In particular, some authors suggest that “moral 
disgust” is a reaction to a subclass of abominable moral offenses, those that reveal 
that an individual lacks normal human motives (those people and behaviors that 
are morally “sick”). At least among Westerners, moral disgust seems to safeguard 
the lower limit of the category of humanity: those actions that “degrade” and 
dehumanize their perpetrators would provoke moral disgust in others (e.g., animal 
abuse or pedophilia).
Cienc. Acad. (Univ. Catol. Luis Amigó) | No. 1 | julio-diciembre | 2020
19
Editorial
The psychology of aversion ... in the days of COVID-19
Moments like this, in which we are especially sensitive towards issues of 
contamination and anxiety seem to implicitly accompany the sighting of human 
presence, it is worth reflecting on the normative implications of aversion, and be 
cautious when validating their visceral diagnoses (“ guilty until proven otherwise ”). 
In a situation like the one we live in Colombia, in which the most immediate and / or 
certain danger for a large part of the population is the lack of resources to survive the 
crisis, the economy of aversion is subjected to a constant “trade off” in which the level 
of baseline aversion is regulated by the perceived benefit of risky behavior (selling 
on the street vs. getting food). Given that our “intuitive microbiology” can be more 
inflexible and supervisory than many emergency policies, this excessive pragmatism 
can have a potential cost in the social sphere, especially when we consider that 
disgust behaves in an associative way (“impurity” / “contamination” / “censorship”) 
and underlies, as an emotional support, the perception of dehumanization and the 
moral censorship of the “different” (“the street vendor does not quarantine” / “he 
is contaminated” / “he does not care for others”). On a personal note, I consider 
that discussing the normative aspects of a feature of human nature (“how should 
we work”) without having a deep understanding of the descriptive aspect (“how do 
we work”) is a spurious exercise: hence the importance of better understand the 
nature of aversion in order to establish better social policies in a context such as the 
one we live in.
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